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In the mid-eighties Valentino Braitenberg published Vehides [ 81, a short but splendid 
book describing a canny progression of thought experiments, each in the form of a 
robotic go-cart driven by a simple circuit (reviewed in this column [24] ). Subtly 
building upon neuroethological theories of how simple nervous systems relate sensation 
to action, Braitenberg designed successive vehicles to demonstrate behaviors that looked 
increasingly lifelike and intelligent. Braitenberg explained the exercise thus: 
We will talk only about machines with very simple internal structures, too simple 
in fact to be interesting from the point of view of mechanical or electrical 
engineering. Interest arises, rather, when we look at these machines or vehicles 
as if they were animals in a natural environment. We will be tempted, then, to 
use psychological language in describing their behavior. And yet we know very 
well that there is nothing in these vehicles that we have not put in ourselves. 
This will be a very interesting educational game. 
One need only read about a few vehicles to see the appeal of the book’s main theses: 
that simple automata can produce interesting behavior in appropriate environments, and 
that animal nervous systems might prove instructive examples for the designs of such 
automata. This “educational game” has a long history, rooted in the anatomical inquiries 
of Descartes [ 121, Bonnet [ 71, and Huxley [ 141. Recently, it has attracted practitioners 
from fields as diverse as ethology, neurobiology, robotics, and artificial intelligence. From 
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animals to animats is the most extensive publication to date to represent the work and 
ambitions of this group, whom we will call animatists: those who seek the rudiments 
of intelligence in the rudimentary intelligences of lower animals, or, alternatively, in 
simulations thereof. Animats is the proceedings of the First International Conference 
on Simulation of Adaptive Behavior (1990) and contains 62 papers out of roughly 90 
submissions. It advertises itself as a field-heralding document, laying out the ambitions, 
methods, and subject matters of what several contributors call “the animat way”. 
Although animal behavior is the leitmotif of the conference, the dominant theme is 
situatedness-the production of competent behavior from minimal (often decentralized) 
control systems in tight sensory-motor loops with the environment. Animatists take the 
situated stance to explain why their virtually behaviorist models-generally stimulus- 
response architectures with highly impoverished representations-are adequate for a wide 
variety of animal-like behaviors. In a few variations, mainly reinforcement learning and 
evolution, and a proliferation of architectures, this theme dominates the proceedings. For 
the most part, these papers are not concerned with the contingencies of animal or even 
robot behavior, such as the actual distribution and detectability of food, the problems of 
sensing behaviorally significant states, or how real environments demand specific forms 
of locomotion and navigation. Rather, those concerns are addressed by a smattering of 
ethological and neuroethological papers, which, partly because of the light they shed on 
the animat programme, may be the most interesting part of the proceedings. 
Animats is the work of many people and consequently records many points of view. 
To give a flavor of the proceedings, we will identify some of its unifying themes, then 
examine some of the divergences between its various constituencies, especially between 
the simulators and the ethologists. In examining the simulators’ approach to animats, 
we will consider animat simulations and algorithms, and adaptivity and evolution in 
particular. We will then discuss the animatist’s view of situatedness, and how this 
relates to the project of building actual robots with interesting, robust, and perhaps 
even useful behaviors. Because there are strong contrasts between the state of the art 
of animat science in 1990 and what the biological record seems to say about control 
strategies, perception, and neural organization of behavior in real organisms, we will 
devote the latter half of the review to these issues, drawing upon the germane and 
often remarkable ethological side of the proceedings. Rather than examine the papers 
in the proceedings one-by-one, we will sketch the framework of theoretical assumptions 
that motivate animat research and discuss the papers that best and worst serve these 
interests. 
1. “The animat way” 
Animat researchers aspire to capture and represent the causal structure of environ- 
ments and tasks in a way that will produce robust and composable behaviors with 
minimal representational overhead. Their methods generally employ learning, evolution, 
or minimalist design. Some authors (e.g., [Meyer, Cliff, Wilson, Brooks, Arbib] ’ ) de- 
’ Papers are referred to by last name of first author; see table of contents duplicated in Appendix A. 
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clare that successful animat designs will lead to parsimonious but potent representations 
upon which more complicated behaviors and intelligences may be built. Ultimately, by 
synthesizing behaviors and building robot animats, these researchers may well be able to 
tell artificial intelligence something about the kinds of representations the body and the 
senses can provide to cognition. There has been a long-running debate over whether this 
would be a rude awakening for AI [ 231. Animatists have already demonstrated success- 
ful behaviors that use unusual representation schemes-for example, a robot that learns 
to robustly navigate cluttered offices using a network of landmark-specific behaviors 
[Mataric], and simulations that mimic the information processing and pathologies of 
salamander, frog, and cockroach nervous systems by topographical maps [ Manteuffel] , 
schema networks [ Arbib] , and neuromorphic ircuits [Beer], respectively. 
Many authors in Animats argue that minimal representations and distributed control 
systems are preferred for their robustness, reactivity, and adaptability (e.g., [Brooks, 
Wilson, Maes] ). The work in this vein deserves a certain admiration: many papers 
describe successful control strategies for locomotion, navigation, exploration, and nest- 
tending that are ingeniously dumb. Many of these strategies, especially those reported 
in ethological studies, are splendid examples of how the task decompositions underlying 
natural behaviors often surpass the rational analyses of tasks that lie at the heart of arti- 
ficial intelligence. Indeed, the consensus of the ethological evidence in the proceedings 
is that nature prefers such solutions, at least for small animals and insects, where “the 
small size of a bee’s brain impresses upon us the need to keep Occam’s razor sharp” 
[ 111. As we will illustrate later, the ethological papers provide an excellent counter- 
point to the studies of man-made systems, revealing animal behaviors that are striking in 
the simplicity of their control strategies, and in the sophistication of their sensorimotor 
support. 
2. Are animats algorithms? 
Much of Animts will be familiar to the AI reader. The proceedings contains a 
proliferation of reinforcement learning algorithms that have been situated in simulated 
environments and trained to forage, follow walls, evade predators, or run mazes. Like 
many animals, these adaptive algorithms must apprehend only a small part of the world’s 
complexity. Unlike animals, their environments don’t have any real complexity, as the 
typical animat simulation resembles a gridded board game (e.g., [ Paredis, Riolo, Sut- 
ton, Lin, Collins, Tyrrell] ) or video game (e.g. [Wood, Ceccioni, Pierce] ). Robotic 
investigations, few in number, are evenly divided between impoverished environments 
such as nonbranching mazes [Nehmzow] and realistically cluttered environments such 
as student offices [ Mataric] , 
As the proceedings indicate, the general practice adopted by these researchers i to 
show that unfit individuals can adapt well to a particular environment by trial-and-error 
learning, either by tuning individual control policies (e.g., [Sutton, Cecconi, Pierce] ) 
or adapting a mix of control policies (e.g., [ Koza, Kurtz, Luigi] > . The environment 
is often little more than a specific fixed problem (e.g., play a short game [Kozal, 
run a particular maze [Sutton], or maximize foraging in a static field [Collins]). This 
does little to support the contention that adaptive control architectures might perform 
robustly across many simple but highly varying or novel problems (i.e., environments). 
Ants incorporate an analysis of the world so successful that they can thrive in widely 
varying habitats, and even adapt to new environmental regimes brought on by changes in 
weather and season. By contrast, there are animats that would be stymied by navigational 
variations as simple as curved walls (e.g., [ Nehmzow] ). 
It is not surprising that these models of behavior, being largely statistical (e.g. [ Roit- 
blat, Nehmzow, Schmidhuber, Booker, Sutton, Lin, Riolo, Pierce, Cecconi, Paredis, Vonk, 
Davidor] ), may only capture components of world causality that are highly specific to 
a particular task; the problem of coaxing inductive systems toward more genera1 causal 
properties of the world is a general concern throughout the proceedings (e.g., [Booker, 
Collins] ), though often honored in the breach. In this regard, many animatists are hob- 
bled by a conceit that frequently arises in AI: They attribute their success with a specific 
problem more to the synthetic aspects of their solution-the quality of their algorithm- 
than to the analytic aspects-their analysis of the task and the representations they’ve 
chosen. 
Even with such simplified environments. researchers have found that many tasks and 
settings require strategies beyond stimulus-response control and trial-and-error learn- 
ing. [Sutton] and [Riolo], for example, suggest that knowledge of the task domain 
should not just be implicitly embedded in the acquired control mechanism, but should 
be explicitly available for “mental” operations. [ Riolo] augments a stimulus-response 
architecture with the ability to look several steps ahead before choosing a response, 
thus departing from the extreme animat position and moving closer toward traditional 
AI projective planning. [Sutton] makes a curious suggestion: His Dyna-Q architecture 
uses acquired world knowledge for mental trial-and-error learning, thereby acquiring an 
optimal control policy with fewer real-world trials. Here explicit world knowledge is 
used only for off-line practice, not for on-line decision-making. Similarly, in an echo of 
Minsky’s 1221 and Braitenberg’s 181 “double brain” schemes, [ Schmidhuber] proposes 
a world-modeling neural network to monitor a control network and direct the animat 
toward “interesting” parts of the environment. Thus the animat may prefer opportunities 
to learn over more extrinsic rewards. 
Evidently, animatists are learning lessons that evoke the early history of experimental 
challenges to behaviorism. Particularly relevant in this regard are the Gestalt demon- 
stration that animals can solve problems that require temporarily retreating from a goal 
(e.g., Kohler’s experiments with apes, suspended bananas, and movable platforms [ 161, 
and Tolman’s demonstration of “latent learning”, or learning in the absence of reward 
and punishment [ 271). 
3. Flirting with evolution 
Since many animatists model simple behaviors that can be implemented in small 
circuits, some are interested in combining blind search techniques with environmentally 
determined fitness measures to see if circuits encoding useful behaviors can be evolved. 
Animat evolution comes in two flavors: with and without phenotype. The latter, which 
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we will discuss in the next paragraph, accretes, merges and mutates control mechanisms 
as if they were genes. The former generally uses genes to specify the connectivity and 
parameters of a neural network. The chief empirical result here appears to be that the 
search space for useful behaviors is, predictably, exploded by such an arrangement; 
one set of simulations which evolves behaviors for a simplified foraging task required 
six days on a Connection Machine [Collins]. The authors of this experiment were 
engaged in a question of interest to the artificial life community-which phenotype 
tends to evolve to fitness faster: feedforward neural networks (show), recurrent neural 
networks (place), or handcrafted modular neural networks (win). Given their highly 
particular nature, it is not clear what general claims these experiments could support. It 
is interesting to note, however, that their results are in line with the hypotheses that ( 1) 
causal insulation (i.e., modularity) is important for reducing complex interactions and 
(2) some internal state (i.e., recurrent networks) can aid even the simplest behaviors 
by integrating environmental cues over time. That the authors did not note these old 
AI chestnuts is a reminder that a substantial number of the animat papers come from 
outside the traditional AI community, which has a history of errors, dead ends, and 
general wisdom about information-processing architectures that would be of use to new 
communities of computational modelers. 
Many animatists seem determined to discover these notions independently. For exam- 
ple, some papers describing phenotype-less evolution-where the direct causal properties 
of the genetic code are selected for-applied evolutionary processes directly to Lisp S- 
expressions and machine codes. [Koza] presents a game-player that uses the results 
from competition with other game-players to evolve small Lisp decision trees; these 
trees eventually comprise a !I-ply minimax strategy. [Harvey] outlines an approach for 
discovering interesting mathematical functions by subjecting random machine-code ex- 
pressions to fitness criteria of interest and vacuity. Although these works are vaguely 
reminiscent of Eurisko [ 181 and highly reminiscent of AM [ 171, they seem to have 
been conducted without the benefit of Lenat’s hindsight [ 191 and, curiously, reported 
without a citation. 
4. Situatedness without situations 
Some researchers suggest that the goal of animat research is to characterize tasks and 
environments in terms of their causal complexity, and identify appropriate robust control 
architectures (e.g., [Wilson, Brooks, Cliff, Meyer] ). In contrast to much of AI, the 
spotlight is on the relationship between the individual and the environment, rather than 
the relationship between intelligence and a task. It is worth understanding this difference 
because it motivates the entire animat programme. Moreover, we think that it is the seed 
of what will ultimately be the animat contribution to AI. 
The glue that makes the animat and its environment an analytic whole is the oft- 
invoked principle of situatedness [ 1 I. This slightly mystical term means nothing more 
(or less) than taking seriously the problems and privileges of having a body: sensing, 
effecting, the significance of place, the use of space, the constraint of time. In the extreme 
situated view, animats are relieved of the crushing responsibilities of representing the 
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world because all the necessary information is available in the immediate environment, 
and, presumably, freely available through the senses. 
The situated analysis of task intelligence is liberating in that it emphasizes subjec- 
tively useful representations over objectively correct world models, and thus frees robot 
designers to attend only to information that has significance vis-a-vis the task [ 2 1. 
However, situatedness implies-or should imply-a greater commitment to the root of 
subjective representations: sensing and perception. AI researchers who are fluent in sir- 
uatednese often speak of “offloading representation overhead into the world”; many, 
though, are aware that they are really offloading to the senses, which have evolved to 
detect behaviorally significant patterns and anomalies in the environment [9,6]. Nihil in 
intellectu nisi prim in sensu. 2 
Oddly enough, the questions of how to sense and what to sense for have been 
side-stepped by nearly all animat researchers; many of the animat models presume 
information not usually available to animals, such as absolute position and reliably 
detectable gradients (e.g., [Sutton, Riolo, Collins, Cecconi, Paredis] ). If not working in 
robotics or ethology, animatists also dispense with the problem of discovering what kinds 
of information the environment actually offers. This is unfortunate, as that is exactly 
where animatists could best advance their field. High-level situated systems are typically 
based on extensive analyses of the informational affordances that support behavior in 
man-made environments 1251. One would expect animatists to do similar analyses of 
natural environments, but one-up AI situatedness by showing that these analyses make 
sober assumptions about sensing and perception. If the animatists succeed in this regard, 
AI researchers will have much to learn from them. 
As for the animat contribution to robotics, it may well prove to be that the main 
obstacle to achieving animal-like behavior is not the development of control mechanisms, 
but the engineering of useful sensors and perceptual systems. The ethological papers in 
the proceedings, which we will review in the next section, have much to say about this 
matter. 
5. Sharp senses, simple minds 
If there is a lesson to be learned from the ethological papers in the proceedings, it 
is that animals’ highly specialized perceptual systems and rich proprioceptive represen- 
tations are often the key to strikingly simple control mechanisms. Two papers from the 
proceedings- [ Teitelbaum] and [ Jamon] -illustrate this nicely. 
One approach to teasing apart the basic components of behavior is selective lesioning 
and suppression of parts of the brain. [Teitelbaum] used transectioning and drugs to 
suppress central motor programs used for spontaneous (voluntary) behavior in rats. 
As they describe it, the impaired behaviors break down into sets of “allied reflexes”. 
For example, injections of the dopamine receptor-blocker haloperidol will make a rat 
cataleptic. Despite the suppression of all voluntary motion, if pushed from behind, the 
rat will leap into the air. The authors explain, “As the cataleptic animal is pushed 
2 Nothing in the mind unless previously in the senses 
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forward, it braces . . . by shifting its weight backwards. When its hind legs begin to slip, 
a leap is triggered . . . When it lands . . . it immediately resumes immobility”. All these 
reflexes are allied in a static postural module, which homeostatically maintains the rat’s 
stability. 
Nearly all the reflexes catalogued by the authors require fairly complex propriocep- 
tive, tactile, and vestibular triggers. For example, a twisting reflex, which helps an 
upside-down rat get back onto its feet, requires a twisted supine posture and forepaw 
contact with the ground in order to trigger rotation of the shoulders. The entire righting 
behavior is a simple concatenation of such reflexes, each initiated by a complex set of 
proprioceptive and tactile cues. 
Several animal studies in Animats found fairly sophisticated sensory triggers in behav- 
iors that, from a control point of view, appear elatively simple. The sensory aspects of 
animal behavior contrast strongly with the sensation-poor animat simulations. Most of 
these simulations have environments and sensory attributes that are impoverished even 
by AI standards, let alone in comparison with robotics and vision domains. Outside 
of robotics (e.g., [Brooks, Mataric] ). animatists are not grappling with animals’ or 
robots’ real information-processing eeds. This certainly does not invalidate any animat 
paradigm; it merely indicates that in order to show that their adaptive control systems 
solve problems, animat builders will have to get into the robot business. Fortunately, 
for simple animats at least, researchers won’t have to solve general computer vision 
problems. Ethologists point out that behavioral triggers are often quite specialized-a 
male stickleback fish will attack a red underbelly sported by just about any stickleback- 
sized object [ 261. For these animals, evolution has found features that can be reliably 
detected and which correlate highly with appropriate conditions for a behavior. With 
few exceptions, animatists have done no such analysis of real-world environments, nor 
have they considered whether feature detectors could be built to meet the informational 
needs of their simulated animats. 
In support of the animatists, it does appear to be the case that many animals do 
use remarkably simple control mechanisms. In fact, the simplicity and elegance of the 
control strategies proposed in the ethological studies easily exceeds that of the control 
algorithms of the animat architectures. 
6. Long trips, little navigation 
An important hypothesis in the animat literature is that environments are rich enough 
in local information to support nonlocal behaviors uch as navigation without full-blown 
internal maps. Many animat navigation systems use one-dimensional representations to 
“tunnel through” the world using landmarks and gradients for guidance [Mataric, Pierce, 
Lin] . One-dimensional representations, such as landmark networks, are far easier to build 
and revise than two-dimensional representations such as maps. Animatists have found it 
profitable to ignore two-dimensional systematicities in the world, such as the fact that 
two paths may intersect or that curved paths have shortcuts. 
Nature, evidently, has found it profitable to use even simpler mechanisms. [Jamon] 
surveys recent debates in the ethological literature about some of nature’s more famous 
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travellers: salmon returning to spawn, bees returning to waggle, and pigeons and rodents 
returning to home. As the examples we recount below suggest, the navigational talents 
of these animals may have been greatly overestimated. 
Transported a relatively long distance from home, rodents have a better than chance 
ability to return. Although this suggests a special orientation mechanism or extensive 
topological maps, a model requiring only a random walk biased by gradual variations 
in vegetation suffices to explain experimental data. Supporting evidence comes from the 
observation that of the mice who were tested, those who were released in patches of 
vegetation with locally inverted gradients started off in the wrong direction and were 
lost for several days. A similar model accounts for the ability of salmon to return 
from the Pacific to their spawning streams. Assuming that salmon are scattered at sea, 
swim straight in a random direction until they reach a coast, and then wander up 
and down the coast until the home stream is found by chance, statistical simulations 
yield return rates that are only slightly below those reported in wildlife studies. This 
gap can be closed by various reasonable assumptions, such as uneven distribution of 
the salmon population in the ocean, and environmental irregularities such as ocean 
currents. 
Stochastic process models are also consistent with the map-like abilities of homing 
pigeons. Homing pigeons are widely believed to use orientation mechanisms when 
they are far from their familiar home territory. Atmospheric gradients are not reliable 
over long distances, so gradient-based orientation is highly subject to noise. [Jamon] 
describes a computer simulation by Wallraff [28] in which model pigeons have learned 
the local intensities and directions of several gradients at home. Far from home, a 
model pigeon determines the probable home vector from each of these gradients with a 
polynomially declining probability of correctness. It then tosses a weighted coin for each 
vector, and averages the results with the current heading for a new heading. [Jamon] 
notes that “remarkably low” probabilities sufficed for simulated homing performances 
comparable with those of actual pigeons. 
As these examples attest, stochastic algorithms may form the basis for some impressive 
map-like behaviors. However, some caveats are in order here. First, the simplicity of such 
a control algorithm is intimately related to powers of perception and locomotion; none of 
the random processes will work well if an animal cannot make a straight line, a daunting 
task for a day’s worth of swimming. Secondly, the reader may object that some of these 
animals are known to have more sophisticated powers of navigation. This is correct, but 
generally pertains to home territory; homing pigeons, for example, are thought to have 
detailed mental maps of the area around their loft. Finally, these behavioral accounts 
are merely statistical simulations that have been parameterized to match the observed 
success rates of real populations. Animals may use different processes and informational 
affordances to produce the same behavior. In order to establish the biased random walk 
model, for example, ethologists will need to show that biological navigation algorithms 
fail in predictable ways, as did the few mice that got lost after an initial misorientation. 
However, even with all these objections, we find the stark modesty of the algorithms 
that might guide such remote travels quite noteworthy. 
One of the most delightful examples of a simple algorithm yielding an apparently 
sophisticated behavior is reported in [ Deneubourg] . Deneubourg and colleagues set out 
M. Brand et al. /Ar@cial Intelligence 73 (1995) 307-322 315 
to model ants’ facility for clustering and sorting larvae in the nest. Their model is a 
random walk combined with two simple rules for picking up and dropping larvae: the 
probability of picking up an object is high if there are no similar objects nearby; the 
probability of putting it down is high in the opposite situation. Using this algorithm, a 
simulated ant colony will order itself in a manner remarkably similar to that of real ants 
reordering a scattered nest. 
One is tempted to speculate that nature uses stochastic control strategies because ( 1) 
they are often adequate, and (2) they presumably require less precise genetic coding of 
neural structures. Indeed, this may be one of a repertoire of strategies that nature has 
for encoding behavior in a nervous system. 
7. The neural encoding of behavior 
After reading so many animat algorithms, one must wonder: Are there natural neural 
organizing principles that we would ultimately recognize as behavior architectures? 
From an architectural point of view it makes sense to segregate function so as to 
prevent unwanted interaction, hence it would seem logical to envision behaviors as 
encoded by individual modules or layers. This design strategy appears to be at work 
in the brains of higher mammals: the human cortex, for example, is characterized by 
localities of specific interconnection patterns, selectively linked by large white-matter 
pathways [ 151. 
However, in lower animals, arthropods, and probably the most ancient structures 
of the mammalian brain, the neural organization of behavior seems to be much less 
systematic-sometimes key functions are subsumed by individual cells. It is also rather 
hodgepodge. Looking at the nervous system schematic of, say, the mollusc Hermissenda 
[ 41, it is quite believable that the neural circuits developed through accretion and random 
rewiring. Instead of modular or laminal organization, we see a multiplicity of neural 
arbitration mechanisms. 
The neuroethological papers in the proceedings describe a smorgasbord of neural 
devices for behavior arbitration. [Beer] describes an artificial cockroach controlled by a 
neuromorphic circuit. Like many of the animals from whose nervous systems its circuits 
were cribbed, the artificial cockroach incorporates several mechanisms for arbitrating 
between competing behaviors. In some cases, a “command cell” is inhibited; in others, 
rhythm-generating cells are perturbed. Connections between cells serving one behavior 
can be suppressed by another behavior, effecting a temporary rewiring of the behavior. 
[ Manteuffel] ‘s simulation of how salamanders visually home in on prey demonstrates 
an organizing principle common in higher brains: the salamander brain has a number of 
topographical maps which project to each other, thereby converting retinotopic position 
to neck-muscle position, which in turn governs the salamander’s direction of approach. 
[ Arbib] ‘s artificial toad, simulated at the much higher level of schemas, often assimilates 
the output of two competing schemas simply by adding their outputs; this coarse-coding 
[ 31 is a familiar computer vision and neural network representational strategy. With all 
these different mechanisms for arbitration and representation, it seems somewhat less 
likely that any single algorithmic architecture will support the full range of behavior we 
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see even in a single insect. 
Indeed, it may be a long time before we see an animat as complicated as an insect. 
Behaviors such as hunting and courtship remain well beyond the state of the art (though 
we are ready to be surprised by their algorithmic simplicity). Conversely, it may also be a 
long time before we see an animat as simple as an insect. This is because of the physics 
of scale. Small animals may get by with simple control mechanisms simply because 
many errors have benign consequences at diminutive physical scales. Insects collide 
and crawl over each other, fall from heights, and stumble and roll without damage. 
Their behavioral repertoire assumes a very forgiving physical world. Where the world 
isn’t forgiving enough, individuals are expendable. Larger size, however, may require 
more intelligence simply because coordination, efficient use of energy, and longevity are 
more important. Ironically, when animatists build robots, the larger scale regimen forced 
on them by modern engineering may require more complicated intelligences than they 
would like. 
8. Related reading 
Ethological and behavior-centered models have had a promising impact in the robotics 
community, where the constraints of body, sensation, and limited computation are real, 
not simulated. Some readers may prefer Maes’ Designing Autonomous Agents [20] 
to the Animats proceedings. Although the two collections have several contributors 
in common, articles in Designing Autonomous Agents are technically more substan- 
tive and represent a more sober approach to building animal-like robots. Although the 
book does not provide as interesting a window into recent developments in ethology 
as Animats does, one article [5] does present a useful introduction to ethology for 
roboticists. 
Those who are more interested in ethology itself may prefer to consult a book survey- 
ing the field (e.g., the Oxford Companion to Animal Behavior [ 21]), or classics which 
have influenced AI researchers (e.g., Tinbergen’s The Study of Instinct [26]). Those 
more interested in neuroethology or computational models of perceptual pathways may 
wish to consult Ewert’s Neuroethology [ 131, or a text of the same name by Camhi 
[lOI. 
9. Summary 
Animats explicitly represents itself as an effort to create a new scientific community 
drawing from the fields of artificial intelligence, ethology, and robotics. The primary 
goal is to discover the underpinnings of animal-like intelligence through the synthesis 
of behavior and analysis of tasks and environments. The quality of the contributions 
varies greatly. The most vivid reading comes from the researchers who have worked 
with real animals, real robots, and real environments. The ethology-meets-computer- 
modeling articles in particular are fascinating, both as a lesson as to how simple brains 
are viable in sophisticated sensorimotor platforms (e.g., [ Jamon, Teitelbaum, Cruse, 
M. Brand et al. /Artljicial Intelligence 73 (1995) 307-322 317 
Manteuffel] ), and simply as an opportunity to marvel at natural designs (e.g. [Ther- 
aulaz, Deneubourg] ) . By contrast, he papers which do not contend with the real physical 
world only offer vague characterizations of the animat problem along with questionable 
algorithms for its solution. Animuts contains a good number of manifestos, proposals, 
critiques of other fields, and algorithms that only superficially address the information 
processing needs of real animals and real robots. This is somewhat understandable, in 
that Animuts is a conference proceedings, not a book, and in that the field itself is 
something of a novelty. 
The papers in Animats raise many issues that are or should be of concern to artifi- 
cial intelligence researchers: What are the informational affordances of tasks and real 
environments? What kinds of error will environments olerate? What kinds of represen- 
tations do competent behaviors really need? What aspects of behavior can be learned? 
What innate predispositions can or should be assumed? What kinds of representation are 
sustainable with real sensors and limited computation? And finally, what might we learn 
about these matters from studying evolution’s answers? It is quite conceivable that when 
animatists gain experience with real robots, sensors, tasks, and environments, they will 
propose answers to these questions that artificial intelligence researchers will have to 
take seriously. Unfortunately, in much of the proceedings, these questions are used as a 
pretense to put reactive and machine learning algorithms through their paces in woefully 
impoverished simulated worlds. Of all these questions, only the last two-sustainable 
representations and the biological record-are well served in the proceedings, the former 
by an occasional robotics paper, and the latter by an intriguing sampling of etholog- 
ical and neuroethological papers. Apparently, the ethologists have gained much more 
by adding computational modeling to their repertoire than computational modelers have 
gained by reading ethology. 
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